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ORDER

1

On May 7,2019, the Court heard Defendants Twitter, Inc. and Twitter International
"

I

2 Company's (together, "Twitter") special motion to strike the complaint under California Gode of
3 Civil Procedure section 425.16 and Defendants' demurrer to the complaint The parties

a~eared

4 by their respective counsel of record. This "constitutes the Court's orders on both motions!

5

Factual Allegations of the Complaint

6

Twitter is a private internet communications platform that users can join and use f0r free by
I

"

7 posting content, limited to a certain number of characters, referred to as "Tweets." Plaintifff
:

8 Meghan Murphy is a self-described "feminist writer and journalist" who resides in Vancouver,
I

I

9 British Columbia, Canada. (Compi. ~~ 5, 20,"70.) She joined the Twitter platform in Apq12011,
10 and used it to "disCuss

news.~orth~ events and public ~ssues, ~hare ~c~es, podcasts and 1ideos,.

11 promote and support her wntmg, Journahsm and publIc speaking actIVItIes, and commumcate WIth
12 her followers," who eventually numbered some 25,000. (Id. ~~ 43, 71.)
13

"

Starting in January 2018, Murphy posted a series of Tweets regarding a person named

14 Hailey Heartless, a self-identified transsexual whose legal name is Lisa Kreut, that

referre~ to that "

15 person as a "white man," called her a "trans-identified male/misognynist," and used the Jale

~~ 91,92,94,96-97 & Ex. Y.) Kreut had identified as a mJ until "
approximately three years earlier. (fd. ~~ 89,98.) In August 2018, Twitter temporarily s~pended

16 pronoun to refer to her. (Id.
17

18 Murphy's Twitter "account, claiming that four of those Tweets violated its Hateful conduJt Policy
19 and requiring her to delete them before she could regain access to her account. (Id.

~

96.) In

20 November 2018, Twitter required Murphy to remove two additional Tweets, and then banned her
. 21 permanently from its social media platform. (Id.

,~ 5-7, 99-103.) Twitter claimed that t h Y had

22 violated its Hateful Conduct Policy by post~g Tweets that expressed views critical of trjsgender
23 people and of what Murphy describes as the "notion of trans genderism." (fd.) Specifically,
24 Twitter required Murphy to remove an October 11,2018 Tweet that referenced five other Twitter
25 users by username and stated: "Men aren't women tho." (Id.

~

5.) It also required her to aelete an

26 October 15, 2018 Tweet that asked: "How are transwomen not men? What is the
27

differe~ce

2
!

28
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I
I

1 between a man and a transwoman?" (Id.). Murphy protested those actions in a third Tweet, which
2 Twitter required her to remove as well. (ld. ~ 6.) It then banned her pennanently after sh~ asserted
I

3 that a transgender woman in Canada fonnerly named Jonathan Yaniv is "the man responsible for
:

I

4 trying to extort money from estheticians who refuse to give him a brazilian bikini wax," ~ked why
5 the media and courts are "protecting this guy's identity," and then posted a legend
.

6 GooglereviewofawaxingsalonpostedbyYanivstating, "Yeeeah it's him." (Id

attache~ to a
.

~~7,

It-13 &
I

7 Ex. E.) Murphy also reposted screenshots of some of her prior Tweets that Twitter had required
I

8 her to delete. (Sprankling Decl. Ex. C.)
Twitter'sHateful Conduct Policy states generally, "We do not allow people to pro~ote

9

10 violence against or directly attack or threaten other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national
I

!

11 origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or disease."
12 (Id ~~ 3,8,51 & Exs. D, E, T.) Murphy alleges that in late October 2018, Twitter amend¢d its

13 Hateful Conduct Policy to prohibit "targeting individuals with repeated slurs, tropes or

01er

14 content that intends to dehumanize, degrade or reinforce negative or harmful stereotypes about a
15 protected category. This includes targeted misgendering or deadnaming of trans gender
16 individuals." (Id ~~ 3,55 & Ex. U.)! The policy explained, "Targeting can happen in a number of
17 .ways, for example,· mentions, including a photo of an individual, referring to someone by

~eir full

18 name, etc."(Id. Ex. U at 4/4.) Murphy claims, among other things, that Twitter failed to provide
19 adequate notice to her or other.users of that change, and improperly applied it

20 (Id

~~

retroactivel~ to her.
I

4,56,61, 105.) She claims the new policy is "viewpoint discriminatory" because it "forbids
.

.

I

.

21 expression of the viewpoints that 1) whether an individual is a man or a woman is determined by
22
23

1 "Misgendering" means incorrectly identifying the gender of a person, especially a trans gender
person, as by using an incorrect pronoun. (https:llwww.merriam-webster.comldictionaryV
24 misgendering; see Prescott v. Rady Children's Hospital-San Diego (S.D. Cal. 2017) 265 F.Supp.3d
1090, 1099 [holding that allegations that hospital staff discriminated against transgender ~oy with
gender dysphoria by continuously referring to him with female pronouns, despite knowing that it
25 could cause him severe distress, stated claim under Affordable Care Act].) "Deadnamingi' means
26 referring to a trans gender person by the name that person was given at birth and no 10ngel1 uses
I
upon transitioning. (https:llwww.merriam-webster.comldictionary/deadnaming.)

27

3

!
I
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1 their sex at birth and 2) an individual's gender is not simply a matter of personal preferenqe,"
I

2 viewpoints she alleges are "shared by a majority of the American public." (Id ~58.) She: asserts
3 that the new policy "contradicted Twitter's repeated promises and representations ... that'! it would
4 not ban users based on their political philosophies, or viewpoints or promulgate policies bbng
5 users from expressing certain philosophies or viewpoints." (Id)
6

Murphy alleges that Twitter ,amended its Terms of Service on May 17, 2012 to pr9vide,

7 "We may suspend or terminate your accounts or cease providing you with all or part of thf
,

i

, 8 Services at any time for any reason, including, but not limited to, if we reasonably believe: (i) you
9 have violated these Terms or the Twitter Rules .... " (Id

~ 63

I
I

.

& Ex. V.) On May 17,2015,
,
!

10 Twitter amended its Terms of Service to state, "We may suspend or terminate your acco~ts or
!

11 cease providing with all or part of the Services at any time for any or no reason, includingl but not
,

12 limited to, if we reasonably believe: (i) you have violated these Term~ or the Twitter Rules ...."
i

13 (Id. & Ex. I.) On January 27, 2016, Twitter revised its Terms of Service to read, "We res~rve the
14 right at all times (but will not have an obligation) to remove or refuse to distribute any cohtent on
15 the Services, to suspend or terminate users, and to reclaim usernames without liability to Jou." (Id
16

~ 64 & Ex. W.) This provision was amended on October 2,2017 to read, "We may also rlmove or

17 refuse to distribute any Content on the Services, suspend or terminate users, and reclaims
j

18 usernames wi~out liabili~ to, yo~." (I~ & Ex. ~.) Murphy alleges that the portions of Trtter' s
19 Terms of ServIce purportmg to gIve TWItter the nght to suspend or ban an account "at any tIme for
20 any or no reason" and "without liability to you" are procedurally and SUbstantivelyunconlcionable.

21 (Id.
22

~~

65-69.)
Murphy also alleges that while she was a Twitter user, she was SUbjected to "numerous

23 violent, explicit threats, along with continual abuse and harassment" by other users for het views
24 on transgenderism, but that although she reported these threatening and harassing Tweets on
25 numerous occasions, Twitter took no action in response. (Id

~

84.) She also alleges that several

26
27

4

i
I
I
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1 Twitter users who praised a violent attack in London in September 2017 on so-called ''trru;ts2· exclusionary radical feminists" are still active on Twitter, and none has been banned. (Id:~ 86.)
In her complaint, Murphy seeks to state three causes of action against Twitter on lier own

3

!

4 behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated and the general public. In her first cause bf action
I

5 for breach of contract, she alleges that Twitter's User Agreement, which includes its Terrris of
6 Service, Rules, and associated policies, constitutes a binding contract with each of its user~,
7 including Murphy, and that Twitter breached that contract by failing to provide Murphy With 30
i

8 days advance notice of the changes to its Hateful Conduct Policy, by retroactively applying the
9 amended policy to Murphy, and by permanently suspending her account although she did :not
10 violate the Terms of Service, Rules or policies. (Id

~~115-116.)

She also seeks to
have the
Court
,
I
I

11 declare the portions of Twitter's Terms of Service purporting to give Twitter the right to sFspend or
.

i

12 ban an account "at any time for any or no reason" and "without liability to you" procedunuly and
13 substantively unconscionable, to sever those provisions, and enforce the remainder of the Icontract.

14 (Id.
15

~~

123-125.)
In Murphy's second cause of action, she alleges that Twitter made several "clear and

16 unambiguous" promises in its Terms of Service, Rules, and Enforcement Guidelines, incltding a
17 statement in the Rules at the time Murphy joined that "we do not actively monitor user's Lntent
18 and will not censor user content" except in limited circumstances not present here, and stltements
I

19 that Twitter would provide 30 days advance notice of changes in the Terms of Service and not
20 apply any changes retroactively. (Id

~

I

128.) She also alleges that in sworn testimony to Congress

21 in September 2018, Twitter's CEO stated that Twitter does not "consider

POlitica1viewpo~ts,

22 perspectives, or party affiliation in any of our policies or enforcement decisions, period." I(Id

~~

23 62, 128(f) & Ex. B.) Murphy contends that she and other similarty-situated users reasonafl Yrelied
24 on these alleged promises to their detriment injoiniIig Twitter and remaining on that Plaiorm, that
25 such reliance was foreseeable and calculated and Twitter intended that customers would rrly on
I

26 these promises in joining and remaining on that platform, and that she .and others have bebn
injured
I
27

5
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I

1 by such reliance by having lost "valuable economic. interests in access to their Twitter accpunt and
."

.

2 their followers forever." (Id. ~~ 129-131.)
3

.

I

'·1

In her third cause of action, Murphy alleges violations of the Unfair Competition iaw, Bus.

~~ 132-144.) She alleges that Twitter committed an Jair' .
business practice by inserting the alleged unconscionable provisi01).s allowing it to suspen~ or ban
accounts "at any time for any reason" into its Terms of Service. (fd. ~ 135.) She also alle~es that
. . I

4 & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (Id.
5
6

7 Twitter's practices are "fraudulent" within the meaning of the UCVbecause Twitter falsely held
.

I

8 itself out to be a free speech platform and promised not to actively monitor or censor userlcontent.

9 (fd.

~~

I

137-140.)
(

10

I

In the prayer for relief of her complaint, Murphy seeks a broad range of injunctivel relief,

11 including orders prohibiting Twitter from enforcing its '~misgendering" rule, directing it to restore

12 access to any accounts it has suspended or banned for violation of that rule, prohibiting it
'13 promulgating

~om'

~r enforcing any other fules or policies that discriminate based on viewpOinl, ,

14 ordering it not to make material changes to its User Agreement without providing 30 daYJ, advance
.

.

.

I

15 of the changes, prohibiting it from attempting to enforce any changes in its User Agreem~nt

.

16 retroactively, requiring it to remove the purportedly unconscionable provisions in its TeJs of
17 Service governing suspending or banning accounts,and requiring Twitter to "issue a full f'd frank
18 public correction of its. false and misleading advertising and representations to the genera public
19 that it does not censor user content except in narrowly-defined, viewpoint-neutral circum tances ..

20 ..» (Compl. at 40-41.) She also seeks declaratory relier tbatTwitter has violated its coftuaJ
21 agreements with Murphy and similarly-situated users, and has violated the UCL. (Id. at 4 1-42.)
1

22

Twitter has filed a special'motibn to strike the complaint 'under California's anti-SLAPP

23 law, Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. It has also fIled a demurrer to the complaint. The Court

~dresses

24 .those motions in order.
25
26
27

6
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I.

2

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(b)(1) provides that "[a] cause of action agjinst a

Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Strike .
I

3 person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right offree petition or free

r

4 speech under the United Slates Constitution or the California Constitution in connection rth a
5 public issue shall be ~Ubject to a special mo~ion to strike, unless the court determines that

e

6 plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." The

7 analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in a familiar two-step approach. (Barry v. StAte Bar of
8 California (2017) 2 Ca1.5th 318, 321.) Before engaging in this analysis, however, a court must
9 consider any claims by the plaintiff that a statutory exemption contained in section 425.1 applies.

1

10 (San Diegansfor Open Governmentv. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 6H, 622.)
11

Murphy contends that the anti-SLAPP law does not apply here, based on two staJtory·

12 exceptions, the public interest and commercial speech exemptions. (Code Civ. Proc. §§

4~5.17(b),

13 (c).) Because the Court agrees that the fIrst of these is dispositive, it need not address the second.2
14

Section 425. 17(b) provides that the anti-SLAPP law "does not apply to any action brought

15 solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public," if all of the following conditions

. 16 exist: "(1) The P.Jairitiff does not

s~ek any re1~~ ~er than or different fro~ the ~lief s+ghtfOr

17 the general pubhc or a class of which the plamtiff IS a member"; "(2) The actIon, If successful,·

18 would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a

signifiCr

19 be~efIt, whether pec~ary or nonpecuniary, o~ .the gene~al public or a large clas~ o~ p~rslns"~ "(3)
20 Pnvate enforcement IS necessary and places a dIsproportIOnate burden on the plaultiff m rFlatIOn to
21 the plaintiffs stake in the matter." A plaintiff has the burden to establish the apPlicabili~I'ofthis
22 exemption. (San Diegans for Open Government, 240 Cal.App.4th at 622, citing Simpson trong-

23 Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Ca1.4th 12,25-26.)
24
25
26
27

A recent decision by the California Supreme Court addresses the latter exemption. (FilmI On. com
Inc. v. Double Verify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 133.)
.
.

2

7
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1

"

The court looks to the allegations of the complaint and the scope of relief sought ib order to
"

(

i

"

I

2 determine whether the public interest exception applies. (Cruz v. City of Culver City (201 6) 2
1

3 Cal.App.5th 239,249, citing Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard (2014) 222 Cal.AppAth 1147, 1460;
4 see also People ex rei. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp. (2012) 210 Cal.AppAth 4871499 "
5 ["we rely on the allegations of the complaint because the public interest exception is a thrtshold
6 issue based on the nature of the allegations"and scope of relief sought in the prayer"].) Die
7 question is whether the plaintiff has "an individual stake in the outcome that defeats apPlilation of
"

I

8 the public interest exception." (Cruz, 2 Cal.App.5th at 249-250 [holding that public interJst
"

" I

9 exception did not apply to claim that city violated Brown Act by discussing and taking action
on a
I
10 change to parking restrictions in plaintiffs' neighborhood even though it was not on the "aJenda,

j

11 where plaintiffs sought personal relief to keep parking restrictions in place].)
12

The exception applies "only when the entire action is brought in the public interes. Ifany

13 part of the complaint seeks relieftodirectly benefit the plaintiff, by securing relief

grea1

than or

14 different from that sought on behill of the general public, the section 425.17 exception dies not

int

15 apply." (Club Membersfor an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 CalAth 309,312 (Sierra
16 Club); see also id.. at 317 ["Use of the term 'solely' expressly conveys the Legislative

that

17 section 425. 17(b) not apply to an action that seeks a more narrow advantage for a particular
18 plaintiff. Such an action would not be brought •solely' in the public's interest. The statuLry

19 language of 425 .17(b) is unambiguous and bars a litigant seeking 'any' personal relief

frO~ ·relying

20 on the section 425.17(b) exception.,,].)3
21

I

Here, the Complaint does not seek damages for Murphy individually, but instead seeks

22 solely injunctive and decl';'tory reliefthat, if granted, would benefit the class of persons

~f which

23 Murphy is a member--e.g., Twitter users whose accounts have been suspended or banneq for
24 3 Twitter argued at the hearing that the requirement that the complaint have been brought f'solelY in
25 the public interest" establishes an independent factor that must be satisfied in addition to the
enumerated statutory elements. The Court disagrees. In context, it is clear that those elerhents "
26 define when an action is brought "solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public."
Nothing in Sierra Club is to the contrary.
27

8
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,

I

1 violation of the "misgendering" rule of the Hateful Conduct Policy, as well as users whose
,

-

I

'

2 accounts have been suspended or banned by retroactive application of changes to Twitter'jS Terms
3 of Service or Rilles, or under the guise of the provision allowing Twitter to suspend accounts "at
4 any time' for any or no reason." (See Compl.

~ 113 [alleging that Murphy "seeks no mon~tary relief

5 other than her attorney's fees. Instead, she seeks injunctive relief that is identical to that sbught on
6 behalf of other similarly-situated persons andthe general public."].) To be sure, suchreli1f, if
7

granted~ undoubtedly, would benefit Murphy personally,
by restoration of her Twitter accdunt,
- '
I

8 which she specifically alleges had "significant monetary value" to her. (Compl. ~ 109.) However,
,

- ,

I

9 she does not seek any relief greater thail or different from the relief sought for 'the class 0 persons -

1

4

10 she purports to represent. (Cf. Sierra Club, 45 Cal.4th at 317 [portions of prayer for relief sought
11 personal advantage by advancing plaintiffs' owri interests in Club elections].) Further, MbhY
12 purports to bring this action on behalf of similarly situated Twitter users, and asserts clails under
13 the VCL, whlch further supports the conclusion that the public interest exemption apPliesl (See

14 Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1460-1461 [holding thatl

'

15 borrower's putative class and representative action against debt collectors under the Fair I ebt
16 Collections Practices Act and the VCL was brought solely in the pUblic interest where Plltiff did
17 not seek damages or restitution on behalf of himself or the class or the general public, but sought
18 only injunctive relief]; Ingelsv. Westwood One Broadcasting Servic.es, Inc. (2005) 129
19 Cal.App,4th 1050,1066 ["On its face, [section 425.17] subdivision (b) appears to exempt class
20 actions and private attorney general suits from treatment under section 425.16. ,~review rfthe
21 legislative history confirms that was the intent of the Legislature."]; see also People ex rei.

22 Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 487,500-505 [public interkst
,

23 exception applied to qui tam action].)
24 4 Twitter argues that Murphy has not alleged that any other specific individual is, in fact, similarly
25 situated. She has, however; alleged that Twitter's rules and policies affect many other pe~sons, and
it appears to be undisputed that Twitter has suspended or banned other accounts for violat~ons of
26 those policies. Murphy's allegations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the public interest
exception applies.
27

9
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1

. On the face of the complaint, the Court concludes the public interest exemption applies, and
.I

2 Twitter's anti-SLAPP motion therefore must be denied. While Twitter is correct that bec~use
3 section 425. 17(b) is a statutory exception to section 425.16, it should be narrowly

constru~d (Sierra

4 Club, 45 CaI.4th at 316), here it applies by its tenus" "It bears emphasizing that our con+mon
5 here is that the plaintiffs' claims are the kind of claims the Legislature intended to exemp~ from the
6 scope of the anti-SLAPP statute when it adopted section 425.17. This conclusion is

entir~IY
I

.

I

7 independent of any evaluation of the merits ofth~se claims, or even the adequacy ofplaiJtiffs'
.

.

.

-

.

.'

I

8 pleadings." (The Inland Oversight Committee v. County ofSan Bernadino (2015) 239 Ca1..AppAth
. .

9 671,678.) It is to the latter issue that the Court next

I

turns.

'

i

10

II.

11

Twitter demurs to all three causes ~f action in the complaint. The dispositive issub common

Demurrer to Complaint
.

.

.

.

I

12 to all three is whether, as Twitter contends, the complaint is barred by Section 230 of the federal
13 Communications Decency Act, 47U.S.C. § 230 (Section 230).5 The Court fmds that it is and
14 therefore sustains the demurrer in its entirety without leave to amend.
15

Section 230(c) bears the heading, "Protection for 'good samaritan' blocking and screening.

16 of offensive material." Section 230(c), subparagraph (I), "Treabnent of publisher or speier/'
17 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
18
19

treat~d as the publisher o~ speaker of information provided by another information conten~ .
provider." (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(I).) An "interactive computer s~rvice" is "any infOrmat+ service,

20 system ... that provides o~ enables computer access by multiplier users to a computer seier." (Id.
21

§ 230(f)(2).) An "information content provider" is "any person or entity that is responsible, in

22 whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided'through the

'.

Int~met
or
I

':: any other interactive computer service." (Id. § 230(f)(3).) Finally, the CDAprovides, "lO cause

5 Twitter also contends that the claims in the complaint are barred by the First Amendmellt. In
25 view of the Court's holding that they are barred by Section 230, it need not reach this additional
issue. (See Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522,534 ["Because the statutory argument [tinder
26 Section 230] is dispositive, there is no ne~d to address the due process question."].)
.
27

10

28
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1 .of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
2 inconsistent with this section." (Id § 230(e)(3).)6
3

Here, there is no dispute that Twitter is a "provider ... of an interactive computer service"

4 within the meaning of Section 230(c)(1). Indeed, federal courts have so found. (See

pe+e v.

5 Twitter, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) 281 F.Supp.3d 874,888; Fields v. Twitter, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 217

.

.

I

6 F.Supp.3d 1116, 1121, affd, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5

7 Cal.5th 522. 540 [holding that Yelp is a provider or user of an interactive computer

servi+1. citing

8 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1101.) Nor is there any dispute that
9 Murphy's Tweets are "information provided by another information content provider." (J7 U.S.C.
.

.

..

j

10 § 230(c)(1), (£)(3); see Hassell, 5 Cal.5th at 540.) The parties' dispute centers on whethe1 Murphy
11 seeks to impose liability on Twitter in its capacity as publisher. Because all three causes of action
12 ofthe complaint seek to impose liability on Twitter for its actions in suspending or bannJg

.

13 Murphy's and others' Twitter accounts, and in enforcing policies governing the permissiJle scope

Se~tion·

14 of content in those accounts-all actions within the traditional scope of a publisher's role-I
15 230 controls.

Congress enacted Section 230 in 1996 '''for two basic policy reasons: to promote re free

16

17 exchange of information arid ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for

:: offensive or obscene material...• . (Hassell. 5 Cal.5th at 534.) 7 Indeed, one impetus for ston 230 ,

20
21
22
.23
24

~ Plaint!ffs conten~ that s?~paragraph (c)(1) sho~d be giyen a narrow reading, l~ti?g it~ scop~ to
Immumty from clrums ansmg out of speech by third partIes, and that the only proVISIon of SectIOn
230 that has any potential application here is subparagraph (c)(2). That subparagraph profides that
"[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer shall be held liable on account of ... any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the prQv'jder or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected .... ". (47 U.S.S. §
230(c)(2)(A).) However, controlling authority has squarely rejecte.d Plaintiffs' argument 'that a
broad reading of section 230(c)(I) would make section 230(c)(2) unnecessary." (Barrett, 40
Cal. 4th at 49.)

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to Hassell in this order are to the Court's pluralIty
opinion. Justice Kruger, concurring in the judgment, did not disagree with the plurality's joverall
26 analysi~ of Section 230. (See 5 Cal. 5th at 548,557-558 ["section 230 imrilunity applies t9 an effort
to bring a cause of action or impose civil liability .on a computer service provider that de~ves from .
25

27

7

11

I
I
·1
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I

1 was "a judicial decision opining that because an operator of Internet bulletin boards had taken an
2 active role in policing the content of these fora, for purposes of defamation law it could bt regarded
3 as the 'publisher' of material posted on these boards byusers~" (Id., discussing Stratton iakmont,

4 Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co . (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 19~5) 23 Media L.Rep: 1794 [1995 WL 32371,]; see

5 also Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 ["section 230'was enacted to remove ,e
6 disincentives to self-regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont case, in which a service provider
7 was held liable as.a primary publisher because it actively screened and edired messages Ptsted on
8 its bulletin boards."].) '''Fearing that the specter ofliability would ... deter service provtders from
9 blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230's broad immunity,' which
.'

.

I

10 'forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial
" -

-

-

I

11 and self-regulatory functions.'" (Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 43, quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
12 (4th Cir.1997) 129 F.3d 327,331.)

-

s

As its plain language and legiSlative history make clear~ "'[Section] 230 preclude courts

13
14 from

~~ing

claims that

~uld p~ a ~pu~

~

service .provider in PUblisher':. role. Thus,

15 lawsUlts seeking to hold a servIce proVIder hable for Its exerCIse of a publIsher's traditIOnal
l6 editorial

~ctions-'such as ~iding whether to publish, Withdraw, pustpone or alter conr-are

17 barred.'" (Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 43 (emphasis added); see also id. at 45 ["'[O]nce a

com~uter

e

18 service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the rol- of a
19· traditional publisher. The computer service must decide whether to publish, edit, or with raw the
20 posting. In this respect, [plaintiffJ seeks to impose liability on AOL for assuming tIW rol1 for
21 which § 230 specifically proscribes liability~_the publisher role."']; see also Hassell, 5 Ca1.4th at

~:

544 [Section 230 was intended to shield service providers "from compelled compliance 1th

24 its st~tus as a publisher or speaker of third party content."] [conc. opn. of Kruger, J.].) Nclither did
Justice Cuellar's dissent. (See id. at 567-568 ["S]ection 230 ... confer[s] immunity ...
a
25 cause of action filed directly against the platform, seeking to hold it liable for conduct as the
publisher of third party content."] [dis. opn. of Cuellar, J.].) Thus, notwithstanding their I
26 differences regarding the other issues posed in that case, a majority of the Court endorsed the core
principle on which this order turns.

against

27

12
I
Case No. CGG-19-573712

28
ORDER

i
I

1 demands for relief that, when viewed in the context of a plaintiff s allegations, ... similarly assign
2 them the legal role and responsibilities of a publisher qua publisher."].)

I

.

I
'I

3

. That this case involves Twitter's decision to take down content rather than to postlit is

4 immaterial: ''No logical distinction can be drawn between a defendant who actively selects
5 information for publication and one who screens submitted material, removing offensive lontent.
6 'The scope of the immunity cannot tum on whether the publisher approaches the

Selecti1 process

7 as one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method or degree, not substance. '"

8 (Barrett, 40 CalAth at 62, quoting with approval Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 11018,
9 1032.) An "editor's job [is], essentially, to determine whether or not to prevent [materi8I fendered
i

10 for] posting-precisely the kind of activity for which section 230 was meant to provide immunity.

II And any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that

th+

parties

12 seek to pbst online is perforce immune under section 230." (Fair Housing Council ofSan
13 Ferna:do Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 521 F.3d 1157, 1170Jl171
14 (footnote omitted).)
15

In light of this overarching principle, California and federal courts are in accord iliat actions

16 that, like the instant case, seek relief based on an internet service provider'S dedsions whJther to
17 publish, edit, or withdraw particular po stings are barred by Section 230. (See, e:g., Cross v.
18 Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 206-207 [CDA barred claim against Facebooi based on
19 failure to remove page that allegedly incited violence and generated death threats against flaintiffs,

1

20 rap artist and affiliated entities]; Doe II v. MySpace, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561,57 [CDA
21 barred claims against MySpace for failure to ensure that sexual predators do not communicate with
22 minors on its website, a "type of

activ~ty-'~o restrict or make available certai1l materialf[that1is

23 expressly covered by sectiori230"]; Sikhs for Justice "SFJ", Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. fal.
24 2015) 144 F;Supp.3d 1088,1094-1095 lCDA barred claim under title II of the Civil Righl1s Act of
25

1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a) by blocking access to plaintiffs Facebook page in India, whicbJ sought
' .

.

I

26 "to hold Defendant liable forDefendant's decision 'whether to publish' third-party content."].)
27

.

I
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In particular, federal courts have specifically ruled that a service provider's decisilns to

1

2 provide, deny, suspend or delete user accounts are immunized by Section 230. (See, e.g., Fields v.
3 Twitter, Inc., 217 F.Supp.3d 1116, 1124 [''the decision to furnish an account, or prohibit a
4 particular user from obtaining an account, is itself publishing activity."]; see also Riggs v.
5 MySpace, Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 444 Fed.Appx. 986, 987 [claims "arising from MySpace's decisions
6 to delete ... user profiles on its social networking

w~bsite yet not delt:~te other profiles .. j were

7 precluded by section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act."]; Cohen v. Faceb01k, Inc.

.

8 (B.D.N.Y. 2017) 252 F.Supp.3d 140, 157 ["Facebook's choices as to who may use its Plakorm are.
9 inherently bound up in its decisions as to what may be said on its platform, and soliabiliJ imposed

II

10 based on its failme to remove users would equally 'deriveD from [Facebook's1status or +nducI as
11 a 'publisher or speaker."']; Mezey v. Twitter, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2018) 2018 WL 5306769 at

[CDA

12 barred plaintiff's claims challenging Twitter's decision to suspend his Twitter account].)

13

Finally, that Murphy alleges causes of action forbreach of contract, promissory estoppel,

14 and unfair ·competition rather than defamation or other tort claims does not place her clairs

o~tsiae

15 the scope of immunity provided by the CDA, because all of those claims seek to treat Twitter as a
16 publisher or speaker of information. In·Hassell, the Suprerp.e Court explicitly rejected thJ

.

17 plaintiffs' efforts ''to avoid section 230 through the 'creative pleading' of barred claims. .."
18 (Hassell, 5 Cal.5th at 535.) In particular, the Court held that Section 230 immunity extenrs to
19 claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, (ld. at 537-538, discussing Kathleen R. v. Cif3' of
20 Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.AppAth 684; see also Delfioo v. Agilent TechnolOgies, Inc. (20t 145
21 Cal.App.,4th 790,806 ["While many of the cases addressing CDA immunity have involvid claims
22 for defamation [citations], it is clear that immunity under section 230 is not so
23

.

limited."].~

r

Here, like the. plaintiffs in Cross, Murphy contends her claims are not barred by srtion 230

24 because she is seeking to hold Twitter liable for contractual statements or promises made

its

25 Terms of Service and Rules. (See Cross, 14 Cal.App.5th at 200-201,206-207.) But "[i]r
26 evaluating whether a claim treats a provider as a publisher or speaker of user-generated c9ntent, ..
27

14

28
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1 'what matters is not the nanie of the cause of action"; instead, 'what matters is whether the'cause
2 of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the "publisher or speaker" bf content

~.3d atl101~1102.) Here, the dlies
Murphy alleges Twitter vi~lated derive from its status or conduct as a publisher because .i~S

3 provided by another.'" (Id. at 207, quoting Barnes, 570
4

.

5 decision to suspend her accounts, and those of other similarly situated users who violated its
6 Hateful Conduct Policy, constitutes publishing activity. (Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F.Supp.3d
7 at 157; Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F.Supp.3d at 1123-1124.) As Hassell made clear, "lalsuits
8 seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editoriL
9 functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,

pos~one or alter content-arel barred."

10 (Hassell, 5 Cal.5th at 536.)
11

For this reason, Murphy's reliance on Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.A P.4th

l

12 294 is misplaced. In Demetriades; plaintiff was a restaurant operator who filed a complaint

13 seeking an injunction under the unfair competition law and the Wse advertising law to fent
14 Yelp ~om m~g a series of rep~esent~tions ~bout th~ accuracy and efficacy of its "filt~rr for .
15 unrelIable or .bIased ~ustomer reVIews, mcludm~ that It prod~ced "'the most trusted reVlers, '" (Id.
16 at 300~30L) The trial court granted Yelp's antI~SLAPP motIOn. The Court of Appeal reversed,
17 holding that Yelp's representations about its review filter constituted commercial speech

.thin the

18 exemption of Code of Civil Procedure section 425. 17(c), and consisted of representations offact
19 that were made for the purpose of promoting or securing advertisements on its website.
20. two~paragraph discussion at the end of its opinion, the court acknowledged that "courts

I'
I

a brief

formly

21 hold that claims based on a Web site's editorial decisions (publication, or failure to publis ,certain
22

third~party

conduct) are barred by section 230.". (Id. at 313.) However, it held that Secti n 230 did

23 not apply, because "[n]owhere does plaintiff seek to enjoin or hold Yelp liable for the statlments of
24 third partjes (i.e., reviewers) on its Wep site. Rather, plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable fo its own
25 statements regarding the accuracy of its filter." (ld.)
26
27

15

28
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1

In sharp contrast to Demetriades, fairly read, Murphy's complaint is not seeking tJ hold

2 Twitter liable fur itS purely commercial statements to users or potential .advertisers.'

~er, aJJ of

i

3 her claims challenge Twitter's interpretation and application of its Terms of Service and ateful
4 Conduct Policy to require Murphy to remove certain content she had posted in her Twitter account,
5 to suspend that account, and

ul~imately to ban her from posting from Twitter due to her re1eated
..

I

6 violations of the Terms of Service and Policy. All of those actions reflect paradigmatic editorial
7 decisions not to publish particular content, and therefore are barred by Section 230.
8
CONCLUSION

9
10

For the foregoing reasons, Twitter's special motion to strike the complaint under Code of
.

I

11 Civil Procedure section 425.16 is denied, and its demurrer to the complaint is sustained without
12 leave to amend.
13
14

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

I

Dated: June b019

~
~~
.
..

HO . ETHAN . SCHULMAN

. 16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

8 Barnes is similarly distinguishable. There, plaintiff alleged that Yahoo ''undertook to remove
.
from its website material harmful to the plaintiff but failed to do so." (570 F.3d at 1098.) iThe
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff s theory of recovery under promissory estoppel was not b~ed by
Section 230 because it dod not treat Yahoo as a "publisher or speaker" under the CDA. (Id. at
1107-1109.) Here, as discussed in text, Murphy is not seeking damages for Twitter's failtlre to
comply with an alleged contractual or quasi-contractual promise, but rather is seeking inj~ctive
relief to compel it to restore her and others' Twitter accounts and to refrain from enforcing its
Hateful Content Policy against her. In any event, to the degree that Barnes is arguably inconsistent
with Cross, this Court is, of course, bound by the latter decision. (See Auto Equity Sales, lIne. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,455 ["Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunMs
exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superibr
jurisdiction."].)
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